Radicalization is gradual - and not confined to marginalized members of global societies
This literature review examines cross-disciplinary work on radicalization to situate, historicize, frame, and better understand the present concerns around online radicalization and far-right extremist and fringe movements. We find that research on radicalization is inextricably linked to the post-9/11 context in which it emerged, and as a result is overly focused on studying the other. Applying this research to the spread of far-right ideas online does not account for the ways in which the far-right’s endorsement of white supremacy and racism holds historical, normative precedent in the United States. Further, radicalization research is rife with uncertainties, ranging from definitional ambiguity to an inability to identify any simplistic, causal models capable of fully explaining the conditions under which radicalization occurs. Instead, there are multiple possible pathways to radicalization, and while the internet does not cause individuals to adopt far-right extremist or fringe beliefs, some technological affordances may aid adoption of these beliefs through gradual processes of socialization. We conclude that the term “radicalization” does not serve as a useful analytical frame for studying the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online. Instead, potential analytical frameworks better suited to studying these phenomena include theories prominent in the study of online communities, conversion, mainstreaming, and sociotechnical theories of media effects.
A summary of key take-aways includes:
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The adoption of extremist, far-right, and fringe beliefs is often referred to as “radicalization,” a term formulated post-9/11 to understand jihadi terrorism, a very different context from the far-right.
- Radicalization research is full of uncertainty.
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No specific type of person is vulnerable to radicalization, and most people who commit political violence are not mentally ill or alienated from society.
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Radicalization is not caused by poverty, oppression, or marginalization.
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There is no one way in which people are “radicalized.”
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Viewing extremist media does not necessarily lead to adopting extremist beliefs or committing political violence.
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In contrast to the “red pill” model, radicalization is gradual. Recruits slowly adopt the identities, emotions, and interpretations shared by a community. They conceptualize their problems as injustices caused by others, and justify using political violence against them.
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The internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.
"Radicalization” is not a useful frame for understanding the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online.
- It is analytically imprecise and morally judgmentalIt doesn’t help us understand the role of media and digital technologies.
- It is inextricably tied to a global security infrastructure targeting Islam.
- It doesn’t account for the fact that fringe or far-right beliefs may change what people think is “true” and “false,” making it hard to find common ground.
- The focus on violence ignores other worrying effects of mainstreaming far-right and fringe ideas.
Political candidates draw on their personal identities to build social identity-based coalitions
In this chapter, Kreiss and McGregor focus on candidate and campaign strategic attempts at “identity ownership” (Kreiss, Lawrence, and McGregor 2020) during primary election campaigns, especially through digital and social media. Identity ownership occurs when voters perceive a candidate as a plausible “prototype” (Jackson and Hogg, 2010) for a particular group. This prototypicality is marked by the perception that a candidate fits within and represents said group’s characteristics, norms, and values. To date, a robust body of literature has analyzed candidate “issue ownership” (e.g., Egan 2013), wherein politicians seek to align themselves with the issues their party is perceived by voters as having unique competency to address. Here the authors build on their previous work to analyze and empirically document how during primary elections candidates craft rhetoric and campaigns create communications that attempt to make some identities salient in the minds of voters, align candidates and their platforms with particular intrapartisan social identities, and craft and “extend” their own identities for electoral gain. Their argument is that through communication, and especially given the affordances of digital and social media that facilitate speaking to narrow slices of the electorate (Kreiss, Lawrence, and McGregor 2018), candidates and campaigns strive to construct and convey the identities of the groups of constituents they seek to represent, including conveying information about the policies they will pursue through the lens of appealing to these particular social groups.
The gaps and inconsistencies in the Foreign Agent Registration Act are highly problematic for defending democracy
In this study, the authors map the legal work seven U.S. digital consultancies and public relations firms undertook across social media and digital platforms of behalf of four foreign governments. They find that these firms used a range of different strategies on social and digital media, very few of which featured legally required disclosures linking the content to their country of origin. Firms targeted journalists and other elites, but exactly how is not clear. Our most powerful findings regard what is absent. Our study reveals as much about the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the current FARA disclosure process and gaps in tech firms’ ad archives as it does about the content and strategies of the messages themselves. We conclude with a series of recommendations for technology firms and the Department of Justice for enforcing FARA regulations as they relate to social and digital content.